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In 1958, looking back at his famous novel, Aldous Huxley wrote:
In 1931, when Brave New World was being written, I was con-
vinced that there was still plenty of time. . . .Twenty-seven years
later. . .I feel a good deal less optimistic. . . . The prophesies
made in 1931 are coming true much sooner than I thought they
would. . . . And why has the nightmare, which I had projected
into the seventh century A.F. [after Ford] made so swift an ad-
vance in our direction? The answer to these questions must begin
where the life of even the most highly civilized society has its be-
ginnings - on the level of biology.1
What would Huxley say today, in 1984, almost twenty-eight years after
his 1958 doubts? .Would the birth of healthy "test tube" quadruplets in Mel-
bourne last January,2 following the birth two months earlier of a normal
baby to a woman who had not only been through menopause but had be-
* Mr. Scott is Deputy Chairman of The Law Reform Commission in New South Wales,
Australia, and Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Human Artificial Insemination. A
dynamic force in the Law Reform Movement of 'The New Biology," he is the author of the
highly respected book entitled, The Body As Property, published in not only Australia, but in
Britain, France, and the United States. A graduate of The University of Sydney and The
London School of Economics and Political Science, Mr. Scott became subsequently enrolled as
a Solicitor and as a Barrister of the Supreme Court of New South Wales as well as a Solicitor
of the Supreme Court of England. From 1959 to 1978, he practiced as a partner with Dawson
& Waldron, in Sydney. In 1981 he became a member of the Committee of the National Health
and Medical Research Council to develop a National Code of Practice for Cadaver Tissue
Donations and in 1982 became a member of the Committee of the National Health and Medi-
cal Research Council to develop a National Code of Practice for Cadaver Tissue Donations
and in 1982 became a member of the Committee of the Council to develop National Guidelines
for Medical Research and Human Experimentation-with particular reference to in vitro
fertilization.
Due to the impossibility of obtaining access to several Australian newspaper citations, sev-
eral of the footnotes may vary slightly from The Harvard Uniform System of Citation-Ed.
1. A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED 11-15 (1959).
2. Miner, In-vitro Quadruplets Take a Bow. . .and Dad is on Cloud Nine, Sydney Morn-
ing Herald, Jan. 7, 1984, at 3, col. 2.
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come pregnant by the implantation in her womb of a laboratory-fertilized
embryo made from an ovum donated by another woman,' have caused him
to re-cast the following words which appear in the same pages?
Babies in bottles and the centralized control of reproduction are
not perhaps impossible; but it is quite clear that for a long time to
come we shall remain a viviparous species breeding at random.
For practical purposes genetic standardization may be ruled out.
4
So great has been the rate of medical and scientific advance in human
biology and physiology since mid-century that a new discipline, a new field
of intellectual concern, now flourishes under the name Bioethics (from the
Greek bios (life) and ethike (ethics). Bioethics involves the study of human
conduct in health care and the practice of medicine, with particular atten-
tion to the beginning of life, the end of life, and the impact of modern medi-
cal and scientific advances upon basic human values.5 Bioethics tends to be
an interdisciplinary affair which requires the attention not just of medical
men and scientists but philosophers, lawyers, moralists, theologians and so-
cial scientists, to name a few.
Developments such as in vitro fertilization, human artificial insemination,
the freezing and storage of human gametes and embryos for later resuscita-
tion and use, the concept of brain death, the maintenance of life by artificial
means in the grossly defective aged and newborn, the so-called "right to
die," surgery upon embryos in utero, the decision by the United States
Supreme Court in 1980 to authorize a patent for a new form of man-made
living organism,6 and the breeding by genetic engineering of an entirely new
species of animal, namely a "giant" mouse,7 demand interdisciplinary study
and attention.
A penetrating comment was recently made by a member of the Monash
University Center for Human Bioethics:
Ethical inquiry is important to us when we are unsure of the direc-
tion in which we are heading. Like philosophy, it thrives on self-
doubt. . . . Today, new practices in the biomedical sciences are
3. Baby a World First for Melbourne in vitro Team, Sydney Morning Herald, Jan. 14,
1984, at 3, col. 1.
4. Supra note 1, at 13.
5. See generally, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS (W.T. Reich, ed. 1978).
6. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). See Smith, The Promise of Abundant
Life: Patenting a Magnificent Obsession, 8 J. CONTEMP. L. 85 (1982).
7. B. MORRIS, UNNATURAL SELECTION AND THE DESTINY OF HUMANITY (1984). For
an analysis of this paper see Robinson, . . and What We May Becomel, The Australian, Jan.
26, 1984, at 1, col. I.
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challenging old thoughts: New medicine calls us all in doubt.'
The author was writing of recent advances in the biomedical sciences that
now allow us to intervene in, and on occasions control, the processes of life
and death; examples, which I intend to consider in more detail, include in
vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, and the concept of brain death. "It
is not surprising, then, that in the wake of these revolutionary developments
bioethics is flourishing." 9
What do we mean when we use the word "ethics?" The answer to that
question would require more space than is available in this paper. However,
I believe that I should give some indication of the sense in which I use the
word. I am content to accept the approach of the American moral theolo-
gian Thomas J. O'Donnell, who wrote in 1976 that ethics is a study or inves-
tigation into both the goodness and evil of human actions in light of natural
reason. He continued by contrasting ethics with moral theology which he
observed, "on the other hand, investigates the morality of human actions
against the background of man's supernatural life and destiny, and with the
added assistance of divine revelation."' O'Donnell doubts whether "medi-
cal ethics" should be a distinct field, different from ethics generally. He be-
lieves that ethics lives "at the heart of man . . . . His ethic is his concern
for the moral goodness of what he does."'" The idea that ethics should con-
tain something more than individual personal opinion and, on the other
hand, something more than religious propositions is appealing. Kuhse, in
her analysis of the ethics of in vitro fertilization adopts a notion of ethics
similar to that of O'Donnell, although she makes no reference to his work.
She builds her conclusions in part on the views of 18th and 19th century
thinkers such as Hume and Kant. 2
In our present changing society, questions are continually asked about the
most profound ethical dilemmas, for example, the sanctity of life, as typified
by the debates on abortion, euthanasia, and artificial conception. Yet, it is
not long since some medical men believed that the only fit contents for a
university course on medical ethics were manners and behavior-a kind of
obsession with questions about the pecking order within the profession. Di-
rect evidence of this was given to the Australian Law Reform Commission in
1977. Indeed, at that Commission we became so concerned at the absence of
instruction in ethics in the medical faculties of some Australian universities
8. Kuhse, An Ethical Approach to I VF and ET: What Ethics is All About, in TEST-TUBE
BABIES 22 (W. Walters & P. Singer, eds. 1982).
9. Id at 23.
10. T. O'DONNELL, MEDICINE AND CHRISTIAN MORALITY 6 (1976).
11. Id. at 4.
12. Supra note 8, at 28.
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that we wrote an official appeal to the deans of medical faculties throughout
Australia. In our 1977 report, Human Tissue Transplants, we invited all
such faculties to consider the adequacy of their curricula.'"
For my purposes "ethics," in the sense of a set of rules for behavior, is a
principles of general application whereby the goodness or badness of human
conduct may be judged by reference to reason and consistency. Ethics there-
fore is not theology, but it does involve some supporting theism. However,
ethics and morality are intertwined.
Examples of Current Bioethical Problems
I now propose to examine two unprecedented clinical relationships, both
capable of being labeled biomedical and experimental, both rapidly becom-
ing commonplace in medical practice, both virtually unheard of until twenty
years ago or less, and both abounding with ethical questions. The first con-
cerns the condition known as brain death, and its relationship with the un-
conscious patient in intensive care, and includes the plight of the aged as
well as the newborn whose bodies can function only with artificial support.
The second concerns the patient who seeks to become pregnant by artificial
procedures (artificial insemination (AI) or in vitro fertilization (IVF) and
embryo transfer (ET)).
Unconscious Patients and the Helpless Aged and Newborn
In October 1977 Carol Wilkinson, a woman of twenty, was violently at-
tacked while walking to work in Bradford, England. She was battered about
the head with a stone, and was unconscious when admitted to the hospital
where she was promptly connected to a ventilator. After three days of moni-
toring and testing, there was no detectable brain function. According to the
subsequent Law Report, "the medical team in whose charge she was, after a
number of tests, concluded that her brain had ceased to function and that
accordingly the ventilator was operating on a lifeless body. The life support
machine was disconnected and all bodily functions ceased shortly after-
wards." There was no mention of the involvement of the family of the pa-
tient, or anybody else, in the diagnosis of brain death or the discontinuance
of the machine. Carol Wilkinson's assailant was subsequently arrested,
charged with murder, and convicted. He appealed to the Court of Criminal
Appeal, asserting that he was not guilty of murder, in that the doctors of the
medical team, by switching off the ventilator, were responsible for her homi-
cide. This argument was rejected, and the appeal dismissed. 4 A similar
13. Commission Report No. 7, 7 Aust. L. Ref. Comm. 12 (1977).
14. [1981] R. v. Steel, I All E.R. 422.
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case was heard by the same court at the same time with the same result.1 5
Examples can be given from a variety of countries of doctors who have
not only been involved in litigation but have run afoul of the law by resorting
to the brain death concept. Most of these cases occurred in the late 1960's or
early 1970's. In Japan, Europe, and the United States eminent surgeons
were embroiled in both criminal and civil legal proceedings because of the
lack of clear recognition by the law that death may be diagnosed by refer-
ence to irreversible cessation of brain function.
16
Turning to current practice in Australia, the concept of brain death is well
accepted, understood, and applied in intensive care. It is now recognized by
statute as a lawful means of diagnosing death in almost all states and territo-
ries. 17 The specialist in charge of the intensive care unit at a leading New
South Wales teaching hospital has informed me that that hospital commonly
uses the criteria for brain death promulgated unanimously by the British
Royal Colleges of Medicine in 1976, unanimously reiterated by them in
1979,'8 and adopted by Australian Royal Medical Colleges. When a deter-
mination has been made that a patient has suffered brain death it follows
that support machinery will be discontinued. The New South Wales hospi-
tal to which I referred believes that the determination of death is entirely a
medical matter and that the decision to disconnect life-support machinery is
also a medical matter. At the same time, the hospital firmly believes that the
family of an unconscious patient in intensive care should be brought into the
case as early as possible, given liberal access to the patient, and kept advised
of his progress at least once a day. It has found from experience that this
kind of involvement makes it less arduous to tell them that brain death has
occurred. The hospital makes a point of informing relatives of the occur-
rence of death (i.e., brain death) and normally disconnects life-support ma-
chinery after the information has been passed on. It has rarely had cases
where relatives have attempted to insist that the life-support machinery be
continued. In such cases the hospital insists on exercising its own right to
15. [1981] R. v. Malcherek, I All E.R. 422.
16. Transplant in Question. The Times, Sept. 4, 1970, at 4, col. 1. This news account
reports on the supreme prosecutor's office in Tokyo's ruling that insufficient evidence existed
to indict Professor Juro Wada of the Sapporo Medical College on a charge of "homicide by
misadventure" in connection with Japan's first and only heart transplant operation in 1968.
For reference to a similar Swedish case, see UPDATING LIFE AND DEATH: ESSAYS IN ETH-
ICS AND MEDICINE 21 (D.R. Cutler, ed. 1968).
17. The exceptions are Tasmania and Western Australia.
Although it was reported that Western Australia intended to enact legislation recognizing
brain death, it has yet to be passed. See Simmonds, WA Defines 'Death' to Protect Doctors The
Australian, Sept. 29, 1983, at 3, col. 1.
18. Diagnosis of Death, THE LANCET, Feb. 3, 1979, at 261.
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withdraw the life-support. The hospital has found that continuation of life-
support machinery to a patient in whom brain death has been diagnosed has
a disruptive and adverse effect upon the nursing and medical staffs generally.
Initial decisions to connect a patient to life-support machinery are nor-
mally a much simpler matter than disconnection. Many patients are
brought into a hospital unconscious and connected to ventilators almost as a
routine matter. Occasionally the question of whether to connect a person to
a ventilator will be more complicated. An example of this arose in the same
New South Wales hospital and involved a ninety year old lady who suffered
from a severe respiratory disease who obviously had only a very short time
to live."9 The decision in such a case will involve many factors including
respect for the dignity and suffering of the patient, the amount of equipment
available in the hospital as well as the claims of other patients.
The problems presented by the brain dead patient can be less taxing than
those presented by other unconscious patients whose comatose condition
does not amount to brain death. Probably the best known and most trouble-
some case of this kind is that of Karen Quinlan who has been in a coma in
the United States since April, 1975, when she was twenty-one years of age.
Karen Quinlan retains some residual function of the brain stem. Accord-
ingly she has not suffered brain death although it appears that there is no
prospect that she can ever regain consciousness. None of the medical ex-
perts involved in the legal proceedings concerning her condition held out
any hope that she could ever recover.20
Intractable difficulties can occur when artificial life support by modern
machinery and technology is supplied to the coma patient who is not brain
dead, the helpless aged patient who is dying, the hopelessly defective new-
born child, and other sick or dying human beings whose existence may be an
intolerable burden to themselves, their families, and the community. Except
for the appearance in most Australian jurisdictions of a statutory recognition
of brain death, the present Australian law can offer little comfort or help in
solving these problems. All that it is able to do is to produce the criminal
law of homicide as a general inhibition to those working in the field. Numer-
ous other countries are in the same position. The laws of the past were not
designed for such circumstances. The law is often a crude instrument and it
certainly seems to be so in a case where a family or a medical practitioner is
forced to take defensive measures against the laws of homicide. Speaking
generally, a person commits the crime of murder if he or she intends to kill
19. Information supplied by Dr. D. Tabrett, Head of Intensive Care, Sydney Hospital,
Sydney, Australia, July 23, 1981.
20. See Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A Prosecutoral View of the Quinlan Case, 30
RUTGERS L. REV. 304 (1977).
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another or to inflict grievous bodily harm, and the death of the other person
results. The essential ingredient is the intention to kill. If death is intended,
the law as written will take no account of the motive no matter how hu-
mane.2" The crime of murder may in certain circumstances be reduced to
some lesser offense if the act was not intended to inflict grievous bodily harm
or was due to negligence. But an act intended deliberately to shorten the life
of a person remains under the law a homicide and the consent of the de-
ceased or his family will not alter it. Of course, those who administer the
initiation of criminal procedures may decide not to take action in some cases
but there can be no certainty of restraint in every case.
It is therefore not surprising that a great deal of secrecy pervades these
areas of modem medical practice. We must prescribe better procedures.
With our aging population decision-making about the continuation or cessa-
tion of treatment for patients of the kind described above is now a daily
occurrence.
Some Bioethical and Legal Solutions
Professor Paul Ramsey, the American philosopher and moral theologian,
has suggested that the most useful result would come from an honest deci-
sion by all the medical men and others involved, as to the patient's prospects
of recovery to a form of living acceptable to the community. 22 If their best
conclusion is that no such prospect exists and that continued treatment
aimed at producing a cure is nothing but prolongation of dying then the use
of "heroic" or even "standard" measures of curative treatment is no longer
indicated. Ramsey suggests that there must be a power to bring to an end
treatment which is curative in nature-that is, designed to restore a patient
to reasonable health-but has no hope of achieving that end.23 This does
not mean that other treatment aimed, for example, at making a dying patient
comfortable, should also be discontinued. Maybe it should or maybe it
should not. It will depend ultimately on the facts of the case.
24
Both the law and the community should recognize some objective stan-
dards of treatment to prevent hospitals or doctors from being forced into
procedures based on fear of legal consequences. Conversely, the community
needs protection and security against excessive power on the part of the
medical profession to decide survival or death without restraint. Ramsey
suggests that in every case a decision should be made at a proper time
21. C. HOWARD, AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL LAW 36 (3d ed. 1977).,
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whether further treatment aimed at a cure is "indicated" or "not indicated."
If a patient is regarded as dying, the nature of the treatment should then
change.25
A revulsion against the maintenance of life in extreme cases has spread in
the wake of the Quinlan decision and since the Californian lead in 1976, a
number of "natural death" acts have appeared in the United States.26 Such
legislation has been under consideration in two Australian states, South Aus-
tralia and Victoria. In the United States, allied laws have been introduced in
New Mexico and Arkansas where it is now lawful to withdraw artificial life
support from terminally ill children with the consent of parents and a court,
provided the child does not object. 7
The object of this kind of law is to prevent the direct exercise of dominion
over a helpless body in a way that many see as inhuman and degrading. One
case was reported to a medical journal by an American doctor in the follow-
ing words:
It is true that death is rarely dignified but it is also undignified to
die with a urethral Foley catheter connected to a drainage bag, a
continuous (intravenous) IV running, a colostomy surrounded
with dressings, and irrigation tubes stuck into an abscess cavity
around the colostomy, a CVP line, a moisturized oral endotracheal
tube attached to a Bennett respirator taped to the face, an oral
airway, a feeding nasogastric tube also taped to the face, and all
four extremities restrained. This is the way a friend and colleague
of mine died. When I went in to greet him two days before he died
I could hardly get to the bed because of all the machinery around
him . . . . The friend, of course, couldn't speak, and when he
lifted his hand, it was checked by a strap. Is it necessary to do this
to a human being so his family won't feel guilty about wishing him
to have peace at last?
28
25. Id.
26. For example in: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 through 3803 (1983 supp.); CAL.
[HEALTH & SAFETY] CODE §§ 7185-7195 (1984 Supp.); IDAHO CODE §§ 9-4501 through 4508
(1984 Supp.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.540-600 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 through
24-7-10 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 through 90-323 (1981); TEX. CODE ANN.
§ 4590(h) (Vernon, 1984 Supp.).
27. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-2801-2804 (Supp. 1978); N. MEX. STAT. ANN.
§§ 24-7-1-11 (1978).
See generally, B. SALES, D. POWELL, R. VANDUIZEND ET AL. DISABLED PERSONS AND
THE LAW: STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES (1982).
28. Letter to Medical Economics Mag., quoted in Horn, Death-with-Dignity Laws in
America, The Nat'1 Times, Oct. 3 - Oct. 8, 1977, at 36, col. 4.
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Infertility and Artificial Conception
In Australia at present the practices of human artificial insemination (AI)
and in vitro fertilization (IVF) and embryo transfer (ET), are carried out as
means of dealing with infertility in marriage. There is no doubt that artifi-
cial insemination of married women by donor sperm with the consent of the
infertile husband (AID) is a widespread practice which is growing.29 One of
the immediate reasons for these activities is the acute shortage of children
for adoption. As for IVF, this highly skilled work has been usually, but not
exclusively, employed to assist married couples where the wife has problems
with her fallopian tubes but both parties are otherwise normal as far as re-
productive capacity is concerned.30 In 1977, the Australian Law Reform
Commission drew public attention to AID, IVF, and ET and the possibility
of the birth of children by these processes.3 1 The Commission recommended
that the Australian Government should give early consideration to the so-
cial, moral and legal questions involved.
Until 1982, there was little government activity but a great deal of public
debate. Issues have now crystallized, particularly since the development of
techniques whereby a woman will produce a number of eggs during her
monthly cycle (superovulation), and the development in Australia in April
1981 of freezing techniques whereby reproductive tissues, including fertil-
ized eggs, can be stored for later thawing and implantation. 2 This capacity
29. See generally, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION BY DONOR, (C. Wood, ed. 1980); Smith,
Through a Test-Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 MICH. L. REV. 127
(1968).
30. Supra note 8.
31. Supra note 13.
Chapter Four of AUST. L. REF. COMM. REP. at 7 discusses some of the implications of IVF,
ET, Al, and other medical activities concerned with human reproductive tissues.
32. A reading of press reports in Australia, Britain, and the United States in the months
following the announcement in Australia in April, 1981, that a Melbourne IVF clinic was
holding over twelve surplus fertilized human eggs in cold storage will support this conclusion.
See, for example, the attention given to in vitro fertilization in January and February, 1982, by
The Times (of London), The Sydney Morning Herald, TIME MAGAZINE, NEWSWEEK and
NATURE.
See also, Harrington, For and Against: The Essence of the Arguments as They Appeared in
the Press, in TEST-TUBE BABIES, supra note 8.
In March, 1978, the Chief Rabbi of the British Commonwealth, Dr. J. Jacobovits, publicly
stated in Sydney, Australia, "[W]e would not like to see parents replaced by machines or
computers or test tubes," The Age (Melbourne), Mar. 10, 1975. Six months later, Lord Soper,
the well-known English Methodist clergyman, said in Sidney, "[A]rtificial insemination fulfils
a woman's role in bringing another human being into the world. I cannot see any reason why
a woman should not have a test-tube babe." The Australian, Sept. 6, 1978. On August 24,
1982, it was reported that "[T]he Catholic bishops of Victoria have told a State Government
inquiry that in vitro fertilization is unacceptable." The first ground of unacceptability ad-
vanced by the bishops was that "no process [is] morally or socially acceptable nor condonable
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to freeze and store tissues perhaps indefinitely, and the addition of two previ-
ously unknown characters to the IVF (and AI) dramatis personae, namely,
the ovum donor and the surrogate mother, have precipitated unprecedented
questions and issues. In this article because of space restrictions, it will be
possible to do little more than list the most significant.
1. Frozen, stored reproductive tissues: The technology now exists for
freezing, storing, thawing, and using not only human sperm (and, it is be-
lieved, eggs) but fertilized eggs or embryos. This has long been seen as an
important aid to successful IVF and ET.33 Accounts of the birth of the
world's second test tube baby in Calcutta, India, in October 1978 claim that
the (IVF) fertilized egg had been held frozen for fifty-three days before im-
plantation. The achievement of pregnancy by the implantation of previ-
ously-frozen IVF embryos in Melbourne is well-known.34 To some people
this technology may suggest possibilities of selective breeding, population
control, and ownership of human beings. Therefore consideration must be
given to not only the implications of the collection and storage of these tis-
sues but also of their disposition, discard, and destruction, as well as owner-
ship, commerce, experimentation, and the conduct of tissue banks." I
emphasize that I am not here referring to future events. At least one com-
mercial organization in the United States has for some time engaged in inter-
national trade in human semen; and mail-order do-it-yourself artificial
insemination kits have long been available in the United States. 6
Apart from the central legal considerations of ownership and property
rights in the tissues," there are more specific legal questions. What effect
will the tissue banks and IVF have upon the law of wills? What effect can be
given to a testamentary gift "to my children" by a man who has banked
sperm or a couple who have banked an embryo? There is no physical reason
why the banked embryo could not be implanted in and borne by a relative of
the couple, their own granddaughter for that matter, or by a friend or a
purchaser. Already, a woman has given birth to her husband's child more
by the law which involve[s] destroying, discarding or freezing human embryos. The
Age (Melbourne), August 24, 1982.
33. Edwards & Steptoe, The Relevance of the Frozen Storage of Human Embryos in THE
FREEZING OF MAMMALIAN EMBRYOS at 235 (52 CIBA Foundation symposium, New Series
1977). See also supra note 8, at 9, 10.
34. In relation to the Calcutta birth, see Sydney Morning Herald, Oct. 10, 1978, at 8-10.
35. Supra notes 13 and 31; infra note 50.
36. Information supplied by letter to the author from the Director, Institute of Population
Studies, University of Exeter, England, in January 1980.
37. Scott, Legal Implications of In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, at 24-26, AN-
SAAS Congress, Sydney, May 11, 1982.
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than a year after his death, by using his frozen sperm.3" The facts of life no
longer accord with a historic tenet of the law, namely, that the child of a
woman cannot be born after (i.e., any appreciable length of time after) her
death and that a man's children cannot be born more than nine months after
his death. What effect will this new technology have upon the Rule Against
Perpetuities in its classic form?
Let it not be thought that these are remote seminar points unlikely to
impinge upon real life. The Supreme Court of New South Wales has already
ruled that evidence relating to the cryo-banking of reproductive tissues must
be supplied when the court is asked to sanction the distribution of an estate
to "the children" of a consenting life tenant who is a woman beyond the
normal age of child-bearing.39
2. Surrogate motherhood: Surrogate motherhood by means of AI is well
established in the United States where expert legal and medical practitioners
have appeared in recent years specializing in its arrangement and implemen-
tation.' A "surrogate mother" is a "substitute mother," that is a woman
who agrees to bear a child for somebody else. In a typical situation a mar-
ried couple will make an arrangement with the surrogate under which she
will be artificially inseminated with the husband's sperm. She may or may
not be paid. Surrogate motherhood has a respectable lineage, whatever its
future may be. Two curious biblical examples are described in the Book of
Genesis, the second being of particular interest because Rachel, the wife of
Jacob required the surrogate Bilhah to "bear upon my knees, that I may also
have children by her.""'
Surrogate motherhood contracts raise important legal and social issues. If
the law were to make them effective it would be necessary to assume direct
control of personal behavior and to assert dominion over the body of the
surrogate. Such contracts prescribe conditions under which a child is to be
conceived, born, and transferred. Major questions of public policy are in-
volved. Litigation has already taken place in England and in the United
States following disputes between parties to such contracts.
4 2
Moreover, surrogate motherhood is not limited to people involved with
the practice of AL. In Australia, medical practitioners have recently applied
38. Love ... 18 Months Later, Sydney Morning Herald, July 12, 1977, at 4.
39. Bullas v. Public Trustee, 1 N.S.W.L.R. 641 (1981).
40. N.P. KEANE, DL. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER (1981); Seligman & Curry,
Pregnancy by Proxy, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1980, at 49.
See Smith, The Perils and Peregrinations of Surrogate Mothers, I INT'L J. L & MED. 325
(1982).
41. GENESIS 16, 30:3 (King James).
42. A. v. C. (1978); 8 FAM. LAW 170; The Baby Born of Surrogate Mother, Sydney Morn-
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a new expression to describe surrogate motherhood achieved by sexual inter-
course between the surrogate and a married man with his wife's consent.
The expression is NID (Natural Insemination Donor).43 Wide publicity was
given in New South Wales in April and September, 1982 to a case of this
kind.44 The Department of Youth and Community Services, which controls
the adoption of children in that State, has received since 1982 a number of
formal written applications by members of the public requesting prior ap-
proval to surrogate motherhood contracts and the ultimate adoption of the
children conceived.45
With IVF an additional difficult legal and social question arises. Will a
test tube baby from a surrogate mother be the child of the surrogate, or of
the donor of the egg, or of both? There has been a great deal of legal surmise
on this question. 46 Some writers suggest that the mere donation of the ge-
netic material is insufficient to sustain the donor's claim to motherhood and
that the physical connection of the embryo to the surrogate's body in-
troduces new factors. On the other hand, the embryo itself is a genetic stran-
ger to the surrogate. If the child is to be regarded as having two mothers
what should the law say, for example, in relation to maternal rights and
duties, and inheritance of property? The Australian national ethical guide-
lines on in vitro fertilization of August 1982"7 referred to surrogate mother-
hood but refrained from prescribing ethical guidelines because no IVF child
had been born from a surrogate mother and insufficient emergence of com-
munity attitudes had taken place.4"
3. Ovum donation: On the face of it, ovum donation is similar to surro-
ing Herald, April 25, 1981, at 3; Surrogate Mother Can Keep Baby, Judge Rules, Sydney Morn-
ing Herald, June 6, 1981, at 9.
See Smith & Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy and the New Biology, 67 MARQUETrE L. REV. 63
(1984).
43. Oral information given to The Advisory Committee on Human Artificial Insemina-
tion (New South Wales) in 1982 by the head of the infertility clinic of a Sydney Public
Hospital.
44. Stubbs, Couple in Last-Ditch Bid to Become Parents, The Northern Star (Lismore,
New South Wales), April 19, 1982, at 2, col. 1; Stubbs, Surrogate Mother for Ballina Couple is
Now Pregnant, The Northern Star (Lismore, New South Wales), Sept. 16, 1982, at 2, col. 1.
45. Information supplied orally to the author in 1982 by The Department to The Advi-
sory Committee on Human Artificial Insemination.
46. Sappideen, LifeAfter Death--Sperm Banks, Wills and Perpetuities, 53 AUST. L. J. 311,
319 (1981); Stone, English Law in Relation to A.I.D. and Embryo Transfer in 17 CIBA FOUN-
DATION SYMPOSIUM (New Series 1973) at 75; Rassaby, Surrogate Motherhood: The Position
and Problems of Substitutes, in TEST-TUBE BABIES, supra note 8, at 99, 100.
47. For a description of these guidelines, see text under heading Australia and infra notes
80, 81, and 82.
48. For discussion of the issues see Rassaby, supra note 46; Walters, Human In Vitro
Fertilization: A Review of the Ethical Literature, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23, (Aug. 1979).
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gate motherhood. The procedure envisages the gift of an ovum to an infer-
tile wife, its fertilization in vitro with the husband's sperm, and it's
subsequent transfer to the uterus of the wife. Analogy is more naturally
made, however, with artificial insemination using donor sperm (AID) than
with surrogate motherhood.49 The intention of all parties is that the child
will be borne by and retained by the recipient of the egg. While there are
obviously legal questions to be answered (for example, the question of moth-
erhood), they are not of the same seriousness as those posed by surrogate
motherhood.
The Australian national ethical guidelines on in vitro fertilization of Au-
gust 1982 prescribed conditions under which ovum donation for IVF may be
ethically practiced.5° In contrast, a committee established by the Victorian
Government in 1982 to examine aspects of in vitro fertilization recom-
mended in an interim report that ovum donation for IVF should not be per-
mitted. Furthermore, it believed that the practice should be confined to the
implantation in married women of gametes obtained only from the recipient
woman and her husband."' The final report of the same Committee, in Au-
gust 1983, reversed these recommendations and advised the Victorian Gov-
ernment to establish statutory supervision over the donation of gametes for
the purpose of artificial conception. The recommendations extend to the es-
tablishment of detailed registers by hospitals and the state, as well as the
creation of a network of offenses. It is expected that a bill will be introduced
into the Victorian Parliament to implement this report within a matter of
months.52
Events have, as usual, moved ahead of the law. The first test tube baby
born following the implantation of an IVF embryo made in the laboratory
from a donor egg, occurred in Melbourne in November 1983."
4. The moral status of the embryo: This expression, which refers to the
status to be accorded to a fertilized egg (embryo), is the most significant
philosophical issue raised by IVF. There are those who assert that from the
moment of fertilization an egg must be regarded as a human person and
should be given legal protection as such.54 Others, including philosophers,
49. Walters, supra note 48, at 31.
50. N.H. & M.R.C. Statement on Human Experimentation and Supplementary Notes, at
Supplementary Note 4, para. (3). See also supra, note 47.
51. Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical and Legal Issues Arising from In Vitro
Fertilization, Victoria, Australia, Interim Report at 26, 27 (Sept. 1982).
52. Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical and Legal Issues Arising from In Vitro
Fertilization, REPORT ON DONOR GAMETES IN IVF, Victoria, Australia, (Aug. 1983).
53. Supra note 2.
54. Johnstone, Kuhse, & Singer, The Moral Status of the Embryo: Two Viewpoints, in
TEsT-TuBE BABIES, supra note 8, at 49; Harrington, supra note 32; Lappe, Ethics at The
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moral theologians, and experts closely connected with the practice of IVF,
do not agree that the fertilized egg should be treated as a person from that
moment." Public debate on the issue has, on occasions, been acrimonious,
and it may well prove impossible to achieve a total community consensus. If
a conclusion can be drawn from the lack of legal prohibition of IVF in West-
ern nations and the growth of the practice since 1978, it could indicate that
those who take the fundamentalist or deontological view described first
above are in a minority.
56
The following questions, issues, and assertions have also been widely dis-
cussed: a) Does. IVF involve unjustified cost, and misallocation of re-
sources?" b) Is IVF unnatural?5" c) Should access to IVF be legally
limited, for example, to married couples?59 d) IVF may involve unaccept-
able risk to the mind or body of the resulting child:' (The intensity of de-
bate on this question has decreased with the birth of normal IVF children.
Long-term effects are, for obvious reasons, still unknown.) e) Informed con-
sent should be given by all participants in IVF procedures. 61 f) Is infertility
a condition that should be treated medically? 62 g) IVF may lead to genetic
engineering, cloning, the birth of chimeras, and to ectogenesis.63 h) IVF
should be stopped for fear of what scientists may do next. 64
II. EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE
Despite its success in producing the births of many healthy babies, IVF is,
Center of Life: Protecting Valuable Subjects, HASTINGS CENTER REP. II (Oct. 1978); Waiters,
supra note 48, at 24.
55. Waiters, supra note 48,; N.H. & M.R.C. Statement on Human Experimentation and
Supplementary notes, and Appendix II thereto, supra note 50; PROCEEDINGS OF THE CON-
FERENCE ON IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES, Monash University
Center for Human Bioethics (M.N. Brumby, ed. 1982).
56. See infra note 100.
57. Waiters & Singer, Conclusions and Costs in TEST-TUBE BABIES, supra note 8, at 134-
137; Waiters, supra note 48, at 30.
58. Waiters, supra note 48, at 25.
59. Leeton, Trounson, & Wood, IVF and ET: What It is and How It Works, in TEST-
TUBE BABIES, supra note 8, at 2; Toulmin, In Vitro Fertilization: Answering the Ethical Objec-
tions, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 9 (Oct. 1978).
60. Walters, supra note 48, at 27, 28; Ramsey, Manufacturing Our Offspring: Weighing
the Risks, HASTINGS CENTER REP., 7 (Oct. 1978); Toulmin, supra note 59, at 9, 11.
61. Carey, Informed Consent by Participants: Who Participates? Who Consents?, in TEST-
TUBE BABIES, supra note 8, at 64; Walters, supra note 48, at 28-29.
62. Walters, supra note 48, at 26; N.H. & M.R.C. Statement on Human Experimentation
and Supplementary Notes, supra note 50.
63. Walters, supra note 48, at 30, 31, 36, 37; Toulmin, supra note 59, at 11; Walters,
Cloning, Ectogenesis and Hybrids. Things to Come? in TEST-TUBE BABIES, supra note 8, at
110.
64. Toulmin, supra note 59, at 11.
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properly, still seen as experimental. The Australian NH & MRC Report of
August 1982 used the following words:
While IVF and ET is an established procedure, much research
remains to be done and the NH & MRC Statement on Human
Experimentation should continue to apply to all work in this field
... . In this as in other experimental fields those who conscien-
tiously object to research projects or therapeutic programs con-
ducted by institutions that employ them should not be obliged to
participate in those projects or programs to which they object, nor
should they be put at a disadvantage by their objection.65
There is nothing surprising in this classification, for a great deal of accept-
able medical activity is experimental. How otherwise can medicine advance?
A striking example is heart transplantation. The removal of a human
heart and its replacement with another human heart, or with a mechanical,
artificial heart is something that cannot be simulated. Failure of the opera-
tion means certain death and success means uncertain life. For this reason,
such surgery is carried out only on dying patients who have given informed
consent and whose defective hearts are plainly going to cause rapid death if
nothing is done. The first heart transplant to a human being was attempted
in 1964 in Jackson, Mississippi, with a chimpanzee's heart. It failed. The
first successful heart transplant was performed in South Africa in 1967 by
Dr. Christiaan Barnard. The recipient died within eighteen days. However,
patients with transplanted hearts have survived for long periods from the
early 1970's to the present time.66 The first totally artificial heart was im-
planted in 1969 in the United States. It functioned for sixty-four hours after
which a natural heart became available and was transplanted, but it failed
and the patient died. His widow sued the doctors concerned claiming that
the procedure followed was no more than improper experimentation. She
lost her claim at the trial level and on appeal.67 In December 1982, with
prior approval of the United States Food and Drug Administration which
oversees all experimental use of such devices, an artificial heart was success-
fully implanted in a sixty-one year old male in Salt Lake City, Utah.68
Experimentation has characterized the development of other recent medi-
cal advances, including the treatment of coma patients by reference to the
65. N.H. & M.R.C. Statement on Human Experimentation and Supplementary Notes,
Supplementary Note 4, paras. 1, 9; see also supra note 50.
66. NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1982, at 32.
67. For a review of surgical heart transplantation and the use of artificial hearts and other
artificial organs, see R. ScoTT; THE BODY AS PROPERTY 20-21, 39, 41-47, 180 (1981).
68. Supra note 66.
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concept of brain death, the treatment of defective embryos in the womb fol-
lowing procedures such as amniocentesis, and transplant surgery generally.
In this article I can only summarize some of the recent international and
national statements on experimentation, and suggest what may provide a
practical means whereby society could oversee advanced medical work with-
out stifling desirable initiatives. The same space constraint to which I have
already referred in relation to test tube babies applies to analysis of the sub-
stantial issues raised by experimental medicine, including even the funda-
mental proposition that "all serious therapy is experimental."69
Human Experimentation - International Statements
Western attitudes to medical experiments on human subjects have been
substantially influenced by the Nuremburg Code. A statement of ten princi-
ples, the Code was promulgated by a war crimes tribunal in the years imme-
diately following the Second World War, after the trial of some twenty
physicians "and three others" for crimes against humanity.7" In its judg-
ment the tribunal said (inter alia): "Beginning with the outbreak of the
World War II criminal medical experiments on non-German nationals, both
prisoners of war and civilians, including Jews and 'asocial' persons, were
carried out on a large scale in Germany and the occupied countries."'"
The first rule emphasized the necessity for voluntary consent. The others
prescribed conditions that should apply to all experimentation, including
proper scientific qualifications in those conducting experiments, "the highest
degree of care and skill," the minimization of risk, the right of a subject to
discontinue participation, the elimination of any a priori chance of death or
injury, and a humanitarian justification for undertaking the experiment in
the first place.72
The Nuremberg Code was neither the beginning nor the end of concern
with experimental medicine. It has been written that Galen, the Greek-born
physician who lived in the second century A.D. and was, after Hippocrates,
. 69. EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS (P.A. Freund, ed. 1972). This publica-
tion contains papers by twenty-one contributors who address moral, philosophical, legal, and
social questions posed by human experimentation. The contributors include Margaret Mead,
Hans Jonas, Henry K. Beecher, and Paul A. Freund.
70. 9 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 19 (No. 3, July 1983).
71. 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 at 181 (1941).
72. Id. at 181-183; C.H. WECHT, MEDICAL, LEGAL AND MORAL CONSIDERATION IN
HUMAN EXPERIMENTS INVOLVING MINORS AND INCOMPETENT ADULTS (1975); Bowker,
Experimentation on Humans and Gifts of Tissue: Articles 20-23 of the Civil Code, 19 MCGILL
L. J. 161, 165 (1973); Macklin & Sherwin, Experimenting on Human Subjects: Philosophical
Perspectives, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 434 (1975).
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the most distinguished physician of antiquity, "founded the experimental
science of medicine."73 After Nuremberg, the 18th World Medical Assem-
bly in 1964 adopted the "Declaration of Helsinki" which was sub-titled
"Recommendations Guiding Medical Doctors in Biomedical Research In-
volving Human Subjects."
The Declaration of Helsinki, which was revised by the 29th World Medi-
cal Assembly at Tokyo in 1975, draws a distinction between experiments
that could be called "therapeutic" and "non-therapeutic. '7 4 The former
have been described as any "new procedure in the prevention, diagnosis or
treatment of disease." Therapeutic research or experimentation is, in this
sense, medical treatment using new medical knowledge the direct purpose of
which is to benefit a sick patient. Non-therapeutic research or experimenta-
tion has a wider purpose. It refers to activities and measures designed to
benefit patients generally rather than the particular person who is the subject
of the experiment. The testing on healthy subjects of new drugs not yet
proved to be effective or safe is a good example of this kind of research."
With the rapid advance of medicine in recent years international state-
ments have continued to appear; with a notable example being the Proposed
International Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects
published in 1982 by the World Health Organization and the Council for
International Organizations of Medical Sciences. Further, specific national
attention to the issues raised by human experimentation has been seen by
some countries as necessary. The United States and Australia serve as
examples.
The United States
In the United States, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research was estab-
lished by Congress in January, 1980,76 and concluded its operations in 1983.
Its first report in December, 1981, entitled Protecting Human Subjects,77 had
as its subject matter, "the adequacy and uniformity of federal rules and poli-
cies, and their implementation, for the protection of human subjects in bi-
73. See Wecht, supra note 72.
74. Declaration of Helsinki, Recommendations Guiding Medical Doctors in Biomedical
Research Involving Human Subjects, Adopted by the 18th World Medical Assembly, Helsinki,
Finland, 1964, and as revised by the 29th World Medical Assembly, Tokyo, Japan, 1975, 1
MED. J. AUsT. 206-07 (Feb. 14, 1976).
75. Bowker, supra note 72, at 164.
76. Public Law 95-622.
77. President's Commissi6n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedi-
cal and Behavioral Research, PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS (1981).
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omedical and behavioral research." 78  Included in the report was a
comprehensive survey of all existing United States federal regulations on
human experimentation, an examination of their shortcomings and a de-
tailed analysis of five studies of misconduct by researchers and institituions
in biomedical research.79
,4ustralia
Recent Australian Federal Government action is demonstrated by the Na-
tional Health and Medical Research Council (N.H. & M.R.C.) Guidelines
on human experimentation, of 1982. Published in a volume entitled Ethics
in Medical Research, 80 the guidelines comprise a Statement of general princi-
ples to regulate all experimentation and medical research, accompanied by
four sets of Supplementary Notes for special cases. One supplementary note
provides a code of guidelines for IVF and ET."1 Another deals with re-
search on children, the mentally ill, and those in "dependent relationships,"
such as aged persons, wards of state, prisoners, and members of the Services.
A third prescribes rules for ethics committees in hospitals and institutions
where human experimentation takes place. The fourth provides a detailed
framework for the conduct of "therapeutic trials" defined as "stud[ies] done
in humans to find out if a treatment which it is believed may benefit a pa-
tient, actually does so." These guidelines were first published in August
1982.82
Following publication of these guidelines the Australian Federal health
authorities decided to establish the national Medical Research Ethics Com-
mittee to act as a reference body for questions referred by institutional ethics
committees and to maintain dialogue with Australian Federal and State
Health Departments and Ministerial Standing Committees. In October,
1983, the Committee produced a further report on the use of fetal tissue





80. NATIONAL HEALTH AND RESEARCH COUNCIL, ETHICS IN MEDICAL RESEARCH
(1983).
81. Id. at Supplementary Note 4-In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer at 26-28.
82. FIRST REPORT, N.H. & M.R.C. WORKING PARTY ON ETHICS IN MEDICAL RE-
SEARCH, (Aug. 1982). The Report was adopted subsequently by the Council at its 94th Ses-
sion, October, 1982.
83. The Report was adopted by The National Health and Medical Research Council at its
96th session, October 1983, and is published in a volume entitled ETHICS IN MEDICAL RE-
SEARCH INVOLVING THE HUMAN FETUS AND HUMAN FETAL TISSUE, (1983).
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Achieving Regulation
These examples suggest that there is awareness in Western communities of
significant issues raised by experimental medicine. Unfortunately, it is by no
means clear that this awareness is general, even among scientists and medi-
cal men, or that we yet have all the procedures and sanctions needed for
complete protection of the individual.
Without decrying the immense value and persuasive influence of the inter-
national declarations, it is plain that they lack "teeth." Similarly, guidelines
such as those of the United States and Australia carry no sanction (other
than the threat of failing to qualify for or of being deprived of government
funding for research projects, and perhaps, public criticism or denuncia-
tion).84 Yet the translation of guidelines into firm legal regulation can be
difficult, because of the possibility of inhibiting desirable research, and may,
at a given time, be premature.
Guidelines, criticized by some as "woolly" statements lacking precision
and clarity, are frequently the only means of commencing the journey to-
wards future legal regulation. Take for example the question of surrogate
motherhood. The community is barely aware of the practice, let alone at a
stage where any consensus has begun to emerge, yet there exists the clearest
evidence that the practice of surrogate motherhood is under way and that it
already raises extraordinarily difficult social and legal issues.
The problems for law-making are formidable. Further, experts in the
course of interdisciplinary work have on occasions lifted the lid of experi-
mental practices in institutions, and have recoiled from what they have seen:
Most Australians will react by denying that institution staff in
this country abuse the residents, and by saying that this sort of
thing might happen at Willowbrook in New York, or in Alabama,
but not here. Sadly this is not the case . . . . Occasionally some
of the more extreme examples of the dehumanization of staff and
residents are reported in the papers. There are stories of medical
experimentation; psychosurgery and electroconvulsive therapy be-
ing used as punishments; physical and sexual abuse of residents;
exposure of patients to infectious diseases, including tuberculosis;
isolation; malnutrition; children being placed in wards with vio-
lent, aggressive, or sexually abusive adults; institutional peonage;
denial of medical treatment; and substandard conditions.8 5
There is no shortage in other communities of examples of similar behavior.
86
84. Supra note 77.
85. S.C. & R. HAYES, MENTAL RETARDATION LAW, POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION,
151 (1982); See also, supra note 67, at 125-27.
86. Supra note 77, at Appendix E, 177-92; WECHT, supra note 72.
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The question arises whether experimental medicine as such calls at present
for law reform. At the risk of oversimplification I would have thought not,
although particular activities can plainly call for legal regulation, for exam-
ple, methods for acquiring non-regenerative human tissues, and the use of
cryo-banked fertilized human eggs. For any experiment on a human subject,
informed consent is essential. The laws of negligence and trespass are avail-
able and, together with traditional criminal law, capable of affording reme-
dies against wrongdoers. Even so, a continuous matter of concern with
human experimentation is the possibility of abuse-abuse of physical integ-
rity, abuse by an expert of a position of influence over a potential subject,
and abuse of power in institutional and other settings where the subject may
have little or no practical prospect of obtaining a remedy or enforcing a
right. The protection of human subjects in these circumstances can be pecu-
liarly difficult but, speaking generally, may arguably be as effectively ob-
tained from guidelines of the kind already described, from reform of
administrative procedures, and from publicity, as from the creation of new
legal rights. Already a great deal of protection is available under the law;
but this is not to deny that special circumstances may require special legal
measures.
The Council of Europe displayed an awareness of some of the major issues
in its 1978 model rules on human tissue removal:
A number of experts proposed not to admit imprisoned persons
as donors at all, fearing that such donations might be given in ex-
pectation of a pardon or a good conduct report enabling them to
secure an early parole. The majority . . . however, preferred not
to bring any exceptions for imprisoned donors. . . . If an impris-
oned person gives his consent freely his wish must be respected; if,
however, he is giving his consent under coercion or in order to
obtain a reward against it, then his consent not being given freely,
his donation cannot be accepted and no removal can take place.8 7
My own opinion is that close attention should be devoted to the particular
vulnerabilities of the young, the helpless, and the socially handicapped, when
medical experiments, even for good reason, seek to resort to living human
bodies. The need of such subjects for protection is a reflection of a state of
affairs in which the unrestricted exercise by some persons of a right, a power,
or a liberty can lead to the denial of rights, power, and liberty to others.
87. Council of Europe, Resolution (78) 29, Harmonization of Legislations of Member
States Relating to Removal, Grafting and Transplantation of Human Substances, Explanatory
Memorandum at 17.
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III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF BIOMEDICAL ADVANCES
Writers and commentators frequently indulge in lengthy analysis of legal
problems and issues arising from the New Biology. For example, we are
indebted to both Lord Devlin and Lord Justice Edmund Davies for exposi-
tions of the way in which the ancient legal principles of assault and battery
still govern modern surgery."8 A positive platoon of experts has told us in
relation to AID how the classic laws of paternity will affect (or not affect, as
the case may be) the child, the sperm donor, and the husband."9 Then there
are the problems of the law of wills and the Rule Against Perpetuities in
relation to certain IVF children, etc.9°
In this article I have already given some attention to the impact of existing
legal principles upon new biomedical "situations," but I see limited utility in
this kind of analysis. A little of it can sometimes be useful in proving the
inadequacy of the law. It sometimes makes good material for after-dinner
speaking. But in biomedical matters the law of the past is often so plainly
irrelevant that the need for reform is virtually self-evident; the status of the
AID child is a perfect example. We should be giving our time and attention
to reform and to the future.
Public Opinion
With biomedical subjects how much importance should be attributed to
public opinion in shaping the law? While public opinion should not be the
only determinant, it should, in my view, play a larger role in such matters
than in some others. For example, public opinion would be of little help in
framing new laws on technical aspects of conveyancing, will-making, or
court procedure.
When the Australian Law Reform Commission produced its report,
Human Tissue Transplants, in 1977 it said:
It would be difficult to imagine a reference in which the opinion
of the public was more important in shaping the Commission's rec-
ommendations than this one. . . . The Commission does not sug-
gest that its recommendations for new laws, or that laws generally,
should be simple mirrors of current public will. Laws should not
search for passing popularity. On occasions they may be in ad-
vance of public thinking. More often, however, laws follow, rather
than precede, events. Many of the questions posed by human tis-
88. P. DEVLIN, SAMPLES OF LAWMAKING, 83-103 (1962); Davies, A Legal Look at
Transplants; 62 PRoc. ROYAL SOC. OF MED. 633 (1969).
89. See, e.g., supra notes 29 and 46.
90. See, e.g., Sappideen, supra note 46.
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sue transplants are not susceptible of answer in terms of certainty,
and the desirability of any particular law is not self-evident.9
In that same project the Australian Commission provided an outstanding
example of the significance and measurement of public opinion in its ap-
proach to brain death. The question was whether there should be recogni-
tion by statute of the concept of death by reference to irreversible cessation
of brain function. The Commission itself was satisfied, by the evidence of
medical experts, scientists, philosophers, and moral theologians, that death
can be properly and accurately diagnosed by such reference.
The principal concern of the Commission, however, was not with the cor-
rectness of its conclusion, but with the state of public opinion. It had re-
ceived many cautions, including warnings, that the mere public mention of
"brain death" would raise the spectre of body snatching, cause wide-spread
community disquiet, and prompt diminution of tissue donation. Some sub--
missions said that the law should permanently refrain from any attempt to
define death at all.
The Commission first sought the views of hundreds of persons and organi-
zations in Australia and overseas. They included governments, medical as-
sociations, churches, community groups, and universities. It conducted
public hearings in every Australian capital city. It enlisted the aid of public
television and radio and the press, which was generously given. Six months
later the Commission was satisfied that it had reasonable knowledge of the
state of Australian public opinion on brain death. It had been given the
clearest indication of public acceptance. Not one witness at the public hear-
ings expressed opposition to a legal recognition of the concept, and the writ-
ten submissions were overwhelmingly in favor of it. No evidence of public
anxiety was seen; and the only reservations expressed came from "a small
number of medical men and lawyers." 9
Since completion of the Commission's Report in 1977 statutory recogni-
tion of brain death has been given by legislatures throughout Australia, as
well as in other parts of the world. Of particular significance are the recom-
mendations of the Uniformity Commissioners93 and the President's Com-
mission94 in the United States, and the Law Reform Commission of
91. Supra note 13 at para. 100.
92. Id., paras. 101-03.
93. The Uniform Brain Death Act, 12 UNIF. LAWS ANN. 15 (Supp. 1981), (approved in
1978 by The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws of The United
States).
94. The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research, DEFINING DEATH-A REPORT ON THE MEDICAL,
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH, (1981).
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Canada,'" all of which took the same approach as the Australian Commis-
sion. The last two followed the format of the Australian legislation with its
brevity and duality, stating that in determining death, regard may be had not
only to the cessation of brain function but also to the more usually-encoun-
tered criteria of cessation of circulation of the blood and respiration. The
model statute proposed in the United States by the President's Commis-
sion96 has also been accepted and recommended by the American Medical
Association, the American Bar Association, and the Uniformity Commis-
sioners.97 In New Zealand the concept of brain death had been accepted by
the medical profession as early as 1972.98
I have been discussing the significance of public opinion in circumstances
where a lawmaker is satisfied that a new law or a particular reform is desira-
ble, but is not certain of the temper of public opinion. Ascertainment that
public opinion is favorable obviously brings the matter to a satisfactory con-
clusion. But what about the reverse case? What should a lawmaker do if
shown that public opinion clearly favors a particular biomedical practice,
but he or she is at the same time persuaded that there are long-term implica-
tions that could result in social disturbance, or is influenced by the strongly-
held opposing views of an articulate minority? For example, both Al and
IVF involve a fact that has given little concern to infertile patients and their
medical advisors, or to the community at large, but which has excited fierce
opposition to both practices from some moralists and theologians, as well as
warnings from scientists.
The fact to which I refer is that for the first time in history, reproduction
of human beings has been separated from the act of sexual intercourse be-
tween male and female. This is seen by some as representing the direct un-
dermining of a fundamental religious principle. The scientist, on the other
hand, can foresee revolutionary social changes flowing from elimination of
the need for human beings to mate in order to reproduce. A prominent
Australian immunologist recently expressed the opinion that the practices of
artificial conception that have already developed "have a far greater signifi-
cance for human civilization than the atom bomb." 99 The words of Aldous
Huxley quoted at the beginning of this article thus take on added
significance.
At the same time there is beginning to emerge credible evidence of public
95. Criteria for the Determination of Death, Law Ref. Comm. Canada, Rpt. No. 15 (Min-
ister of Supply & Service, Canada, 1981).
96. Supra note 94, at 160.
97. Id.
98. Editorial, The Moment of Death, 75 NEw ZEALAND MED. J. 97 (1972).
99. Supra note 7.
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approval of human artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization. In the
past two years three Australian national public opinion surveys conducted
by the Australian affiliate of Gallup International have shown high rates of
public approval of both practices, in the region of 70%. "o A 1983 survey of
a more penetrating nature concerning AID is now in the course of evalua-
tion and seems likely to give similar confirmation.'' It may well be that the
medical profession, its patients, and the public are sensibly confining their
attention to present practices and present problems, and do not find them
disturbing. Should not reform and lawmaking on such a subject be a step-
by-step progression, and not an attempt to encompass all possible future
difficulties?
Should a legislator reject public opinion (assuming that it is reliably made
known to him) and instead respond to his own apprehensions, or to direct
external pressures? It is a difficult question but my personal answer is no. I
believe that those of us who live in Western-style democracies should be
influenced by that fact in relation to lawmaking. A democracy is not an
autocracy, a theocracy or an aristocracy, and accordingly its laws should not
be made, and legal prohibitions should not be introduced, in response to the
demand of minorities and in defiance of public opinion. This is particularly
the case when existing laws, made for earlier social conditions, cause injus-
tice and highlight the need for reform. We have already seen that this has
happened in the case of brain death, and with human artificial insemination.
Principle
It is possible that both credibility and acceptance of legislation will be
determined to a large extent by the presence or absence of clear underlying
principles. If it is obvious that the framers of the law have taken into ac-
count fundamental considerations of justice or morality, for example, the
tension between the public interest in improved community health standards
on the one hand and individual rights to personal autonomy on the other; or
the reasonableness of an individual's claim to a particular kind of medical
treatment, or to justice under the law (for example, the claim of the AID
100. See Brumby, Australian Community Attitudes to In Vitro Fertilization, MED. J. AuST.
650 (Dec. 10/24, 1983). This article analyzes two surveys conducted respectively in July,
1982, and April, 1983, concerning IVF, showing-inter alia-public approval ratings of 67%
and 74%, respectively. A survey by the same organization (The Roy Morgan Research Centre
Pty. Ltd.) in September, 1983, concerning AID, conducted at the request of The Advisory
Committee on Human Artificial Insemination of New South Wales (of which the author, Mr.
Russell Scott, is Chairman) showed public approval at 70%.
101. Survey conducted by The Advisory Committee on Human Artificial Insemination,
supra, in 1983 under the direction of Dr. G. Rawson of the Department of Health Administra-
tion at The University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia.
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child to a clear legal status), that law should have a better prospect of
survival.
Referring again to the report Human Tissue Transplants the Australian
Law Reform Commission devoted a chapter to explanation of the principles
underlying its recommendations and the basic questions which it sought to
answer before drafting model legislation.1 2 That legislation has now been
enacted with only minor variations in all Australian mainland states and
territories.
Sanctions and Punishment
The prescription of penalties and sanctions in a biomedical statute can
raise special consideration. First, it is possible, that a biomedical law may
not need penalties at all. If its function is to prescribe orderly procedures on
a subject that may be directed to securing benefits for both individuals and
the public, and which does not arouse moral indignation or offend commu-
nity values, it may be preferable to omit offense provisions. The English
took this view with the Human Tissue Act, 1961. Much will depend on the
purpose and provisions of the statute.
Secondly, if penalties are called for, the question of severity should be
carefully considered. One reason is that in many Western societies a hidden
sanction already applies to members of the medical professions. This arises
from the fact that conviction for a criminal offense, even if the penalty is
minor, will expose the practitioner to disciplinary measures, and could ulti-
mately result in deregistration and loss of the right to practice. It may there-
fore be that even a small penalty could have a drastic result. Further, there
is the possibility that a penalty of apparent reasonableness could result in
injustice. My comment here is dictated by consideration of the Report of the
Victorian Committee on Donor Gametes in August 1983.103 A number of
the recommendations of that Committee advocated that specified actions be
made unlawful. These could include the acts of patients who may seek to
join a hospital IVF program using donated gametes, without first undergo-
ing a long period of medical treatment, or who may act in a way that causes
confusion in relation to the genealogical origin of a child (for example, a
husband and wife having sexual intercourse on the same day as the wife
receives an implanted embryo). Arguably, there should be no penalty in
some such cases. It will be interesting to see whether the Victorian legisla-
tion, when prepared, will impose criminal penalties upon infertile couples
102. Supra note 8,, at Ch. 2.
103. Supra note 52.
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who breach the proposed statute in circumstances that would not normally
be thought punishable or even liable to criticism.
The Practicability of a Statute
A final consideration for lawmakers on biomedical subjects is the necessity
for a proposed statute to be practicable. Two illustrations will show the
value of considering questions of practicability and common sense. The first
relates to the issue of whether the law should require that comprehensive
personal records be kept in relation to AID and IVF. My understanding is
that comprehensive records are normally kept in relation to IVF. AID how-
ever, is a different matter. The practice of clinics destroying records of AID
is well documented in both England"° and Australia,"°5 no doubt because of
the possibility of drastic legal consequences befalling a donor. Reasons can
be offered to support the desirability of comprehensive record keeping, in-
cluding the assistance that such records can offer to the future psychological
and medical welfare of the child and the donor. Reasons may also be offered
for maintaining secrecy and confidentiality of at least part of the records,
namely that part that would identify a sperm donor.
Assuming that a law were to be introduced requiring that personal records
be kept, but providing for confidentiality of identifying information, the fact
is that no entirely effective guarantee could ever be given to the persons af-
fected that secrecy and confidentiality would be total or permanent. The
least of the reasons for this is that laws can be abolished or amended. In
other words, if a record is kept there must always exist a possibility that its
contents will become known regardless of the safeguards.
In these circumstances, should a record-keeping law that requires secrecy
and confidentiality be regarded as practicable and capable of achieving its
object? I suggest that the answer to this question has to be yes. My reason is
that the imperfection of such a law arising from its liability to be abolished
or amended, is characteristic of all law in a sovereign state. Human institu-
tions are not perfect.
The second illustration of the need for practicability relates to the proposi-
104. See LAW COMMISSION (ENGLAND), FAMILY LAW-ILLEGITIMACY, LAW COM.
RPr. No. 118, paras. 12.22, 12.23, (H.M.S.O. 1982).
105. Direct viva voce information was supplied to the Advisory Committee on Human Ar-
tificial Insemination in 1982 and 1983 by medical staffs at artificial clinics operating in New
South Wales that records relating to Al are destroyed on a regular basis. See supra note 100;
See also, Currie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Do-
nor in the United States, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585 (1979); Smith, The Razor's Edge of
Human Bonding: Artificial Fathers and Surrogate Mothers, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 639, 644
(1983);
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tion, which I support, that the law has no business, or mandate, to regulate
all aspects of a citizen's life. There are, arguably, some areas in which the
law should not become involved, particularly if they lead to interference
with intimate matters where personal autonomy should prevail. A related
consideration is that the law should not risk bringing itself into disrepute by
purporting to proscribe behavior when the proscription has little prospect of
being effective. Thus, one frequently hears in discussion of human artificial
insemination, the suggestion that AID, and even AIH should be made un-
lawful except when done by a licensed hospital or medical practitioner.
Thus, a woman self-administering Al at home, using her husband's sperm,
would commit an offense." 6 A law to this effect has been envisaged by more
than authoritarians. The Council of Europe in its 1979 draft model code on
human aritificial insemination provided that non-medical performance of
AID should be unlawful.
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My own reaction to this suggestion is to doubt the possibility of its effec-
tiveness. Human artificial insemination is, in one sense, only a step removed
from sexual intercourse. The thought of a modem law, anywhere, attempt-
ing to proscribe or regulate copulation is risible, to say the least. In our
1984, as opposed to George Orwell's, how could such a law ever be adminis-
tered or policed? With artificial insemination, the likelihood, in my view,
would be that such a law would receive little respect. Practicability suggests
that the lawmaker could think of regulating human artificial insemination
when publicly practiced--overtly or covertly-by hospitals, clinics, the med-
ical profession, or anybody else, and should not envisage controls over the
private behavior of every private citizen.
IV. CONCLUSION
Evaluation of Law, Guidelines and Monitoring Procedures
Is there a touchstone that will enable accurate evaluation of the merit of
suggestions for government and community response to bioethical problems
and biomedical advances? I think not. Each problem and each advance is
106. See generally, Smith, A Close Encounter of the First Kind: Artificial Insemination and
an Enlightened Judiciary, 17 J. FAM. L. 41 (1978).
107. Draft Recommendation on Artificial Insemination of Human Beings, Dir. Jur. (79) 2,
Arts. 2, 4. (March 5, 1979, Strasbourg).
Interestingly, the member nations of The Council of Europe did not accept the Draft Code.
In a letter to the author, Mr. Scott, dated June 21, 1984, from Mr. Ferdinando Albanese,
Deputy Director of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat General of The Council of Europe, it is
stated, "The Council of Europe draft Recommendation on the artificial insemination of human
beings is still before the Committee of Ministers and there is no indication, for the moment, of
any intention of the Committee to put this draft again on its agenda."
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likely to require its own response. If the official armory of responses con-
tains guidelines, common law, existing statutes, and new legislation, which
one or more of them should be produced to resolve the issues raised by ge-
netic counseling, artificial conception, or the permanent coma patient who
still has some brain function?
Sometimes new legislation will be clearly needed, as it has been with
human tissue transplantation. On other occasions the law should, at pres-
ent, leave well enough alone, as is undoubtedly the case with some of the
conjectured future consequences of genetic engineering and in vitro fertiliza-
tion. Sometimes guidelines may be the best means of providing assistance,
and at the same time encouraging work that could bring substantial benefit
to the community. In principle I favor a monitoring approach rather than a
prohibitory approach. There are great benefits to be gained for society from
experimental medicine and the New Biology. At the same time there are
obviously dangers and risks.
A tension arises between the urge to improve the human condition, and
reactionary concern that social institutions may be weakened. It is no an-
swer for science simply to demand unfettered freedom, or for opponents of
proven procedures that are not manifestly harmful to call for blanket legal
prohibition, as some have continually done with IVF. Knowledge cannot be
unknown. My own preference for a general approach on the part of society
and the law to biomedical advances is, first, to regard the entire field as one
of national interest and not of sectional or parochial concern. Next, because
the issues tend to be complex, they demand an interdisciplinary adjudica-
tion. How can doctors, lawyers, scientists, politicians, theologists, or philos-
ophers alone resolve the issues posed by the artificial prolongation of life, or
genetic manipulation?
Direction should come, ultimately, from the Parliament, which should en-
visage permanent monitoring of developments. The monitoring body should
have the skills to formulate, and recommend when needed, guidelines, codes
of practice, and legal controls. We already have the pale glimmerings of
such an organization in Australia with the existence of the National Medical
Research Ethics Committee and a national Law Reform Commission. One
thing is clear, and we no longer need Aldous Huxley to confirm it: the
problems of bioethics will not diminish. They will multiply. We need bal-
ance, courage, and compassion. We also need enlightened lawmakers.
